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1 -A changing scene 
Major structural changes have affected the information and communication 
technology (ICT) industry during the past two decades. These changes have 
encompassed technology, regulatory frameworks, market structures and indus-
try output. The result of these profound changes is the transformation of this 
industry>>S image from that of a protected sector offering a limited and often 
monopolistic service and operating in a stable and unchanging market structure, 
to an industry at the forefront of technological change, providing a host of differ-
ent services and products, operating in a highly competitive market system and 
destined to transform societies and economic structures (Antonelli, 1991; Capello, 
1994; OECD, 1988a and 1988b). 
The significance of information and (tele)communication in a modern 
economy lies in its compatibility and «technological convergence>> with advanced 
computing technologies, which has greatly expanded the economic potential of 
the ICT sector. By enabling computers to communicate over space (the «death 
of distance>>) and by enabling people to communicate through computers, the 
ICT emerging from this «technological convergence>> lies at the heart of a com-
pound set of technological and economic transformations conveyed by the gen-
eral term «Information Economy>> (Gillespie eta/., 1987; Jonscher, 1983; Porat, 
1977; Williams and Gillespie, 1989). 
The growing awareness of the changing role of information of (tele) com-
munication in the economy raises a fundamental question about the reasons of 
these structural changes. Although technological dynamics are generally pin-
pointed as the major causes for modifications in the ICT sector, an analysis of 
this transformation process focusing only on the technological aspects would be 
misleading in trying to conceptualise the new characteristics of the ICT sector. 
In this context, at least four factors can be regarded as prominent causes 
of the transformation of the ICT sector: 
Technological dynamics- Although it is not the unique reason for 
change, the technological revolution is certainly playing an impor-
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tant role in the development trajectories of the ICT sector. A host 
of product innovations takes place, from digitalisation of switching 
and transmission equipments to a broad range of new services 
which offer high transportation possibilities of data, voice, text and 
images (section 2); 
Institutional dynamics, changing the market structure from a mainly 
regulated market to a competitive market, imposing new «game 
rules>>, after decades of traditional static oligopoly (in manufactur-
ing firms» market) and monopoly regimes (in the service market) 
(section 3); 
Market dynamics, stemming from an increased awareness of users 
about the strategic importance of these new infrastructures, and 
stimulated through the customers' attempt to influence suppliers 
towards specific products and innovation, thus acting as «techno-
logical gatekeepers» (section 4); 
New economic relationships characterising the information and (tele) 
communications «filiere», representing the matrix of economic 
relationships among manufacturing firms, and between suppliers, 
operators and customers. The traditional oligopolistic rules which 
have historically governed manufacturing firms and their linkages 
with public operators have been substituted in the last decades 
for competitive rules, by low national protective barriers and by 
greater competitive threats from firms belonging to previous sepa-
rated sectors (section 5). 
After a sketch of the background factors which are of decisive importance 
for the development pace of the ICT sector, two important economic behavioural 
factors will be outlined, viz. the importance of network externalities in the ICT 
sector (which may explain an exponential growth in adoption) (section 6) and 
the strategic significance of the timing of adoption of ICT technologies in a 
competitive market (which may explain the phenomenon of forerunners and 
backrunners in technology adoption) (section 7). After this review of critical suc-
cess factors, the paper seeks to pinpoint finally policy recommendations (sec-
tion 8). 
2 -Technological dynamics 
It is undoubtedly true that a radical technological process is governing the 
ICT sector. This dynamics has some crucial and basic features which can be 
summarised as follows: 
Pervasiveness to all countries and sectors; 
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Change in intersectoral barriers; 
Specific national responses to modern technological development. 
These elements will now concisely be described. 
The technological changes taking place in the ICT sector encompass both 
the manufacturing and the service sectors, i. e., hardware and software. As re-
gards the manufacturing sector, all three main branches of the equipment in-
dustry (switching, transmission and customer equipments) have been widely 
influenced by radical technological changes, increasing technological potentiali-
ties of products and new innovative output. In this field rather radical innova-
tions are embodied in the transition from analogue to digital switching equip-
ment, or from cables and wires to fibre-optics, or, more recently, from microwave 
systems to satellites (Monk, 1989). Even more evident is the host of radical 
innovations taking place in the service sector, offered on more advanced physi-
cal infrastructures and thus capable of transmitting text, voice, image and data. 
In this regard, an important phenomenon is the pervasiveness related to 
the demand side. The diffusion of new information and communication technolo-
gies is taking place horizontally in all sectors of the economy, rendering a stra-
tegic importance to these technologies to pursue a better economic perform-
ance. Pervasiveness is also characterising the geographical diffusion of these 
technologies: both core and peripheral regions have an interest in developing 
these technologies. Peripheral regions are supposed to exploit information and 
capital and thus to need more strategic resources which are not equally distrib-
uted over space. By the same token, core areas are interested in infrastructural 
endowment, even more so if these infrastructures represent the strategic means 
towards comparative advantages. 
Another characteristic of modern technological dynamics in the ICT sector 
is its ability to eliminate traditional inter-sectoral barriers, and opening up com-
petition between previously separated sectors. The software component in new 
networks and services has risen to a high extent, legitimating informatics firms 
to enter the (tele)communication market. For traditional (tele)communications firms 
the threat from these new entrants was reinforced by two factors: 
The lack of technical know-how required to produce new services with 
high software components; 
The lack of managerial know-how to develop strategic corporate poli-
cies in highly competitive markets, originated by years of collu~ 
sive oligopolistic rules that never stimulated aggressive market 
policies. 
National responses to these recent challenges and changes have shown 
much variation reflecting in part differences in national market characteristics and 
also in market structure (monopolistic versus competitive markets). Technologi-
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cal trajectories have thus followed national development patterns. These national 
differences have become crucial once countries have faced a liberalisation proc-
ess of the sector, which has not prevented local industries from international 
competition. lnternationalisation of the (tele)communication sector has in fact 
underlined national differences in the ICT industry's performance. The existing 
technological asymmetry in advanced networks and services among countries 
reflects at least different time trajectories of new investments rather than differ-
ent intentions in investments (see also section 7). 
3 - Institutional dynamics 
In Europe, the EU has recognised the need to provide common rules to 
achieve equal institutional trajectories in the EU countries. For example, the EU 
proposal expressed in the Green Paper published in 1987, provides an interme-
diate model with regard to the two previous extreme models. In abstract terms, 
the regulatory structure is essentially based on the following two conflicting regu-
latory principles, viz. a supply-led approach governed by «universal service pro-
vision» and a demand-led approach governed by a differentiated development 
of key customers in value added, high growth markets. The EU has started the 
liberalisation process by adopting an intermediate position reflected by (see 
Camagni and Capello, 1989; Camagni et a/., 1993): 
A competitive structure in customer equipments markets; 
A competitive structure in advanced services markets; 
A monopoly structure in basic networks (albeit with third party access). 
Despite some advantages this model incorporated also some weaknesses: 
The distinction between basic and advanced services is ambiguous, 
so that a protection of a basic service monopoly may hamper 
innovation; 
The competition between private and public networks regarding value-
added services leads to the problem of capacity re-sale from pri-
vate companies. 
In order to care for some of these shortcomings, the EU has in so-called 
<<accompanying measures» added new guidelines to avoid distortion 'mechanisms: 
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An official list of basic network services to be offered under a protected 
regime, such as telephone, telex and data transmission; 
A revision of tariff structures for private networks, which would be cal-
culated on the basis of the volume of transported information -
i. e., a tariff should be closer to costs and should not differ from 
one country to another; 
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An abolishment of cross-subsidy mechanisms between telecommuni-
cations and postal services, the second ones having always been 
heavily subsidised from the first ones, thus limiting financial re-
sources available to be invested again in the public telecommuni-
cations domains. 
The complex dilemma created by the two contrasting principles is witnessed 
by the fact that after many years of intense debate over the best market struc-
ture of the ICT sector only a few common agreements have been reached. But 
the regulatory movement has certainly induced many new initiatives which have 
affected the ICT sector in Europe mainly through two crucial elements, the first 
one represented by the extreme national trajectories of the liberalisation proc-
ess - despite the EU efforts to ensure a new uniform process - and the sec-
ond one by the different timing of the liberalisation process in different branches 
of the industry. 
The existing differences in the national trajectories have become crucial, 
once liberalisation has been imposed in all countries and the specific innovative 
capacities of each single country is tested. Inevitably, firms which had to face 
competition for a longer period will have more advantages in terms of marketing 
policies than those used to operate in an oligopolistic market. Their privileged 
position stems from: 
More consolidated market policies, based on their longer experience 
on the market and their longer contacts with customers; 
More consolidated product innovation policies, based on greater tech-
nological, scientific and organisational know-how. 
New strategic behaviours for these firms are in this respect a possible so-
lution, i. e., the development of strategic agreements with more advanced inter-
national firms (see also Koski and Nijkamp, 1996). These corporate strategies 
have two important feedbacks: 
To acquire technical, managerial and organisational know-how, de-
stroyed during years of monopoly and oligopoly market structures, 
in a limited time period; 
To maintain market shares, though divided with a previously selected 
partner, instead of risking to lose their market share. 
Corporate external growth allows the decrease of technical and managerial 
gaps between advanced and backward firms, avoiding for the latter firms the 
negative effects from liberalised systems. An example of such negative effects 
of liberalisation on backward firms can be found in Great Britain, where British 
Telecom, faced by Mercury competition, changed its purchasing policies favour-
ing Japanese and American technically more advanced customers premises 
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equipments, rather than national firms' products, thus destroying several British 
ICT manufacturing firms (Charles et a/., 1989). 
Another asymmetry in the institutional process stems from the difference in 
the timing of liberalisation process in different industrial branches. This different 
timing in liberalisation helps in understanding the present corporate strategies 
put in place in different branches. 
The customer premises equipments market has been the first sector gov-
erned by competitive rules, such as a high rate of product innovation and «price 
war>>. Cooperation agreements represent the best corporate strategies followed 
by these firms, especially by technologically backward firms, trying to obtain more 
advanced know-how, exchanging it with market shares. 
Nowadays, even the traditional network service providers face competitive 
rules in their markets. National carriers, traditionally operating in a monopoly 
market structure, start facing competition in both traditional telecommunications 
services (the telephone service) and advanced services markets, e. g. cellular 
telephone markets. 
The two cases are in some respect different. In the case of the traditional 
telephone service, competition stems in general from other European carriers: 
since 1st of July 1997 British Telecom has entered the Dutch market and since 
1st january 1998, no national barriers exist for traditional carriers. Competition 
at a European level favours countries with stronger supply structure, created 
through years of extremely favourable telecommunications public policy. This is, 
for instance, the case of Great Britain, historically more oriented towards competi-
tion. The other extreme case is represented by Italy, which has always denied 
resources to develop strong national telecommunications supply, and has fa-
voured other sectors of public policy. 
In the case of the new mobile telephone service, competition is mostly na-
tional, with new firms entering the market. While in the first case national pro-
viders face competition in their traditional market areas by firms with a long-
lasting experience in this market, in the second case both providers and 
competitors enter a service market niche for the first time, competing even in 
the creation of the necessary infrastructure networks. These competitors are in 
general firms traditionally belonging to other sectors, and in particular to the 
informatics sector, generally based on competitive rules. This element can turn 
out to be a strategic advantage for new firms with respect to traditional telecom-
munication carriers, which are used to oper~te under monopolistic market con-
ditions. 
4 - Market dynamics 
Through the development and use of private networks, users have recently 
acquired a steadily growing awareness of the strategic relevance of these infra-
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structures for their day-to-day activities, as is witnessed by the growing number 
of fax and PC users in the last decades. They have developed over time the 
capacities for using these new and technologically complicated communication 
systems and, moreover, the capacities of specifying their needs on the basis of 
previous applications, personal experiences and personal learning processes. 
The consequence of this growing awareness of the strategic relevance of 
these infrastructures is represented by the active role the demand plays in the 
diffusion of these new technologies. Demand can facilitate the diffusion of these 
technologies through the development of the following incentives: 
Learning processes of technical systems characteristics; 
Learning processes of possible applications of these technologies to 
solve corporate strategy problems; 
Learning processes of possible integration of new technologies in an 
existing organisational structure. 
Moreover, through such learning processes some users can even become 
«technological gatekeepers», being able to choose appropriately among a mul-
tiplicity of innovations. Thus, a corporate strategy oriented towards bridging sup~ 
ply and demand turns out to be the most appropriate policy in periods of rapid 
technological changes. 
Through this bridging, cross learning processes between supply and de-
mand can be put in place, providing great advantages for both demand and 
supply. It is clear, in fact, that cross-learning processes can be crucial for sup-
pliers to produce communications services and computer networks tailored to 
each adopters» needs, thus satisfying at the same time the demand communi-
cations needs and the supply market penetration necessity. 
Such successful and efficient communications systems can easily become 
a reference model for initiative adoption processes, these processes forming the 
basis of rapid cumulative penetration rates of these technologies. 
5 - New economic relationships 
Both the technological and institutional changes underlying the telecommu-
nications sector have raised considerably the level of competition in the last 
decade and this change had some deep supply implications. 
The collapse of inter-sectoral barriers generated by technological changes 
has offered informatics firms the possibility to enter the telecommunications 
market, thereby providing technical know-how in the production of value-added 
services and switching equipment software. 
In the sphere of value-added services, the high technical requirements con-
cerning software have implicitly given a great possibility to enter the market. 
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However, value-added services represent a sphere of activity where both 
(tele)communications manufacturing firms and public operators have tittle to lose. 
For manufacturing firms, value-added services represent a relatively small busi-
ness area, where they could easily provide hardware (i. e., customer services 
equipment) to support these services, but where manufacturing firms would less 
be interested in directly producing these services. 
A different perspective characterises the public operator»s position. For 
public operators the entrance of informatics firms in the telecommunications 
market by providing value-added services leads to: 
A direct competition, in the provision of the same value-added serv-
ices on the network; 
An indirect competition, through the common - though sometimes in-
formal - phenomenon of capacity re-sale. 
Against this background phenomenon common in most European countries, 
competition in customer premises equipments increases international competi-
tion among manufacturing firms operating in this market, with severe implica-
tions for the present supply structure. Some considerations are noteworthy here: 
Firstly, a major threat for all European firms is not represented by 
European competition itself, but by American and Japanese firms 
legally entering the European market. These firms represent a high 
potential threat in terms of more advanced technical products and 
more ad-hoc marketing policies developed through years of ex-
perience in competitive markets (especially for the American case); 
Secondly, even at a European level, competition will favour countries 
with a stronger supply structure, created through years of ex-
tremely favourable (tele)communications public policy. This is, for 
instance, the case in France, with a historically strong supporting 
public policy devoted to the creation of «national champions••. 
The effects of internationalisation of customer premises equipment are pro-
found, once radial technological differences among products exist. For «weaker 
firms» this means the development of some appropriate policies in order to face 
competition and protect market shares. The most appropriate policies are con-
cerned with cooperation agreements with foreign advanced firms, such as joint 
ventures and other equity agreements. In this way, weaker firms would achieve: 
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At one side, more advanced technological know-how in less time, 
imposed by radical institutional changes taking place in the 
sector; 
At the other side, the protection of markets, shared with a partner 
chosen on the bases of some delineated and precise agreements. 
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Even in the liberalised provision of advanced services, some changes will 
take place. In this case, competition increases between firms belonging to pre-
viously separated sectors. While informatics firms are legitimated to offer their 
technical know-how in the provision of value-added services, with a high soft-
ware component, traditional manufacturing firms are often excluded from the 
provision of these services because of the lack of technological know-ho required. 
The most appropriate corporate strategies for both informatics and 
(tele)communications manufacturing firms are, once again, cooperation agree-
ments, this time with the unique aim of achieving technical complementary 
assets. 
6- Implications of network externalities 
The products and services offered by the ICT sector are largely based on 
network configurations and operations. Networks are systematically organised 
structures aiming to serve user demands and efficient operator's principles. 
A network in the ICT sector is critical in generating competitive advantages 
among firms and comparative advantages among regions. In this section we 
will focus on the concept of network externality as a driving force for a rapid 
penetration and adoption of new ICT services. This concept has been introduced 
by industrial economists as the main explanation for diffusion processes of in-
terrelated technologies. The key idea at the basis of all studies dealing with 
network externalities is that the rate of growth in the demand for interrelated 
technologies is dependent on the number of subscribers or clients already us-
ing that specific technology (see for details also Capello and Nijkamp, 1998). 
Since 197 4, with Rohlf's paper on network externality, this concept has 
become the subject of many studies interpreting it as a fundamental and strate-
gic issue in the diffusion of new technologies (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). 
The term «network externality» stems from the well-known economic con-
cept of externality. In economic theory an externality is said to exist when an 
external person to a transaction is directly affected (positively or negatively) by 
the events of the transaction. The concept of network externality is related to a 
simple but fundamental observation that the user-value of a network is highly 
dependent on the number of already existing subscribers or clients. This means 
that the choice for a potential user to become a member of the network is 
dependent upon the already existing number of subscribers or clients. This basis 
but crucial statement has strong implications not only for the development tra-
jectories of new networks but also for some crucial elements such as tariff struc-
ture, network interconnections, standardisation processes, optimal dimensions of 
networks and inter-network competition. In other words, the existence of net-
work externality has some far-reaching consequences for the actual operation 
and policy choices regarding networks. The notion of network externality is thus 
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essentially related to the value of the network, depending on the already exist-
ing number of subscribers. This (varying) benefit of a network for a client is 
thus different from the given cost of access to the network for the advantage 
which an individual receives and does not pay once he joins the network. 
From this perspective, network externalities are the economic motive for 
the adoption of and entry to the network and are becoming the essential expla-
nation for the diffusion of new interrelated technologies. Firms' decisions to join 
a new network depend primarily on the number of already existing subscribers 
in the network and not solely on the cost of purchasing the technology itself. 
The ICT industry seems to offer the most appropriate context for studying 
network externalities and all economic consequences they provoke. The ICT 
system is, in fact, characterised by some strategic features, which can explain 
the existence of network externality, namely: 
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a) Interdependence of consumer's utility, since the choice of a person 
to joint the network is dependent on the behaviour of other clients; 
b) Interdependence between potential adopters and users of a new 
technology, since the latter may create for the former a reduction 
of search costs and market prices for complementary inputs, main-
tenance and skills stemming from their experience in using the tech-
nology already adopted, through dynamic learning processes; 
c) Interdependence between potential users and suppliers- on the one 
hand, the know-how and the experience accumulated by suppliers 
acts as a driving force in the adoption process. In fact, the adopt-
ing users are facilitated in the search for know-how and comple-
mentary inputs (i. e., organisational strategies) thanks to precise 
«guidelines» provided by the suppliers. On the other hand, the higher 
the number of adopters, the broader the know-how of the supply 
will be. In other words, the relationship between supply and demand 
generates cross-learning processes, via the bridging between de-
mand needs and supply knowledge; 
d) Interdependence between producers of complementary technical 
components and products in the (tele)communication «filiiHe»- The 
interrelation of sub-markets may provoke externalities, since the profit 
function of a producer is influenced by the economic transactions 
of other producers whose behaviour affects the market prices of 
intermediary inputs; 
e) Interdependence between users' productivity, since the advantages 
obtained by a firm on its productivity are dependent on the number 
of already networked firms. In fact, the advantages obtained through 
the use and exploitation of these technologies are a function of the 
number of firms already using them. 
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While the first three features affect the utility function of a final individual 
user, the last two act on the productivity of firms, the telecommunication service 
acting as an input factor in the production function. Moreover, there features 
are related to both telecommunication manufacturing firms and service provid-
ers (the telecommunication production sphere) and to the adopting firms using 
these technologies as final or intermediate products (the telecommunication use 
sphere). 
Figure 1 presents a typology of network externalities on the basis of the 
previous ICT market features. In the top-left quadrant of figure 1, network exter-
nalities are related to the ICT adopters and are the typical consumption network 
externalities acting on the utility function of an individual final user. Here, the 
interdependence among utility functions of users of ICT networks is at the basis 
of the traditional network externality concept. ICT demand is more and more 
explained through interrelated decision making processes of adopters, a situa-
















Source: Capello, 1994. 
Productivity 
(intermediate use) 
A well-known example of consumption network externalities is the so-called 
hardware/software paradigm (Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986), regarding the 
strong interdependent preferences dominating the choice of a consumer to buy 
a certain kind of hardware. In the words of Katz and Shapiro (1985:424): «An 
agent purchasing a personal computer will be concerned with the number of 
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other agents purchasing similar hardware, because the amount and variety of 
software which will be supplied for use with a given computer is likely to be an 
increasing function of the number of hardware units that have been sold.» Also 
in this case, the benefit that a consumer derives from the use of a good is an 
increasing function of the number and behaviour of other consumers, in this case 
the fact that they buy compatible items. 
At the users side, another kind of network externalities is present, which is 
called in the literature adoption externalities (Antonelli, 1992). In the diffusion 
processes of these technologies a crucial role is also played by collective learn-
ing processes, like in all cases of complex technologies. Again, these processes 
seem to hide a sort of network externality mechanism, because of non-paid 
advantages that potential users of the technology gain from the experience of 
old adopters. For potential adopters, non-paid advantages may emerge from lower 
search costs of complementary inputs, or from specific know-how on how to 
use and maintain the technology, stemming from consolidated experience on 
the use of these technologies accumulated by previous adopters. 
However, these features, recently interpreted as an externality mechanism 
(Antonelli, 1992), may be in reality only explained through the traditional con-
cept of dynamic learning processes, similar for their effects, but different in nature 
from the traditional concept of network externalities. Learning processes stem in 
fact from the concept of dynamic economics of scale (Spence, 1981 ), while 
network externalities stem from the non-paid benefits obtained by interdepend-
ent mechanisms. 
The same can be said for the case of ICT product firms acting on the 
utility function of ICT users through cross-learning processes (bottom-left quad-
rant). Again, users benefit from these learning processes, through dynamic econo-
mies of scale, which are different in nature from the concept of network ex-
ternalities. 
Network externalities in the ICT sector do not only affect the final user, by 
impacting on his utility function. In the ICT industry also the intermediate user 
(or supplier) acts under certain particular features (bottom-right quadrant). 
As far as the ICT technologies production is concerned, ICT networks are 
built upon an array of interrelated technical components such as terminals, trans-
mission facilities and switching equipments, as well as intermediate outputs in 
the extremely complex ICT «filiere». The interrelationship exists both in vertical 
relationships (intermediate inputs for ICT outputs) as well as in horizontal final 
products markets (advanced terminals whose development stimulates value-added 
services such as Minitel, and electronic mail). 
In both horizontal and vertical interrelationships t.1e behaviour on the mar-
ket of each economic agent (reduction of prices, new market niches) affects posi-
tively the profits of the other interconnected producers. However, these kinds of 
advantages are typical «filiere» economies, stemming from a vertical integration 
in a sector. In other words, these advantages may be associated with traditional 
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«economies of scale>> generated in a vertically or horizontally strong market 
relationship (bottom-right quadrant in figure 1 ). 
Another extremely appropriate example of these kinds of «filiere>> econo-
mies is presented by the hardware/software industry. Computers (hardware) and 
programs (software) have to be used together, and the greater the sales of 
hardware, the higher the profits for software producers will be via the technical 
interconnectivity of the two markets. 
Finally, an interesting situation concerns the interdependence among pro-
ductivity of different intermediate users. In this case, we can again speak of 
network externalities, this time related to the use of the service as an input factor 
for other products, thus having an impact on the productivity level of firms (top-
right quadrant in figure 1 ). In this framework, both the concept of pecuniary (net-
work) externalities (Scitovsky, 1954) and technical (network) externalities (Meade, 
1954) may be useful. Pecuniary externalities are provoked whenever the profits 
of one producer are affected by the actions of other producers. In other words, 
pecuniary externalities act on input factors decreasing their costs and thus hav-
ing positive effects on the output. This category differs from the «technological 
external economies>> defined by Meade (1954) as those advantages obtained 
by a firm on its output through the non-paid exploitation of the output and input 
factors belonging to other firms. The latter category sees external economics as 
a peculiarity of the production function, i. e., these external economies act on 
input factors productivity. Through the increase in the input productivity these 
external economies influence positively the corporate output. 
For ICT network users, the use of the network generates an increase in 
input productivity (or profit advantages), only partially covered by the costs of 
joining the network. The non-paid advantages obtained by a subscriber joining 
a network provoke unintended positive effects on the economic performance of 
the new subscriber. Thus, if network externalities represent the (economic) motive 
for entering the network, a better economic performance of firms is the (eco-
nomic) effect they produce at the productivity side. 
In recent years, the broad definition given to network externalities has ex-
panded it towards network externalities in the production sphere (manufacturing 
firms and service providers), thus losing the precise meaning of the concept and 
substituting it for more traditional economic concepts. 
While consumption network externalities in the context of the use of tel-
ecommunications (top-left quadrant), as well as adoption externalities (learning 
processes (bottom-left quadrant) and «filiere>> economies (bottom right quadrant) 
have been widely identified and analysed in the literature, a still unexplored field 
of study is the measurement of the effects of network externalities on the pro-
ductivity side. The non-paid advantages of users joining a network are reflected 
in the performance of these subscribers via the reduction of input factor costs 
or the increase in their productivity. An empirical analysis of network externali-
ties and the related impact on both the regional and firm's performance can be 
found in Capello {1994). 
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7 -Timing of adoption of ICT technologies 
Much research has been undertaken on entrepreneurial innovation and 
adoption of new technologies (e. g., Bertuglia eta/., 1995), but far less attention 
has been given to the dynamics of innovation processes. This raises in particu-
lar an intriguing question on optimal timing of the adoption of a new technology. 
For example, the early adopter (a firm or a region) may run the risk to choose 
a technology which either may be considerably cheaper in the near future or 
may soon be obsolete due to a new superior technology. Thus, modern firms in 
a competitive market are faced with a great many uncertainties regarding in-
vestments in new communications technologies. This issue of timing of technol-
ogy adoption in an uncertain business environment will be dealt with in the 
present section. 
The ICT sector is not only facing adoption uncertainty, but involves two 
additional characteristics which further complicate the adoption decision by a 
potential user: 1) irreversibility of ICT investments and i1) interdependence of 
users' benefits from ICT, i. e., the presence of network externalities. This means 
that there is always a risk that a potential user adopts the technology which 
may have superior characteristics in the initial stage, but may turn out to be an 
incompatible substitute in the future, so that he. may then be stranded by later 
adopters. 
The issue of the timing in ICT adoption is only scarcely investigated in the 
literature. There are however, some interesting contraptions. First, we may refer 
here to Farrell and Saloner (1986), who showed that the present network exter-
nalities may inefficiently hinder the adoption of innovations. They pointed out 
that the incompatibility of technologies with network externalities and the installed 
base may lead to excess inertia - i. e., to a too late adoption of innovation 
from the society»s point of view - even with complete information. Later on, 
Saloner and Shepard {1995) provided empirical evidence for the presence of 
network effects in the adoption of automated teller machines. Another major new 
contribution was offered by Choi (1994), who compared the private and social 
incentives for the users to wait before adopting an irreversible new technology 
with network externalities. Unlike Farrell and Saloner {1996), Choi incorporated 
in his two-period model for adopting a new technology the option of waiting. He 
concluded that firms tend to adopt new technologies too early compared to the 
social optimum in the presence of network externalities; in particular, the early 
users of a modern technology appear to embrace a new technology too soon 
compared to the social optimum. 
The time of the adoption of a new technology is likely to be critically de-
pendent on the type and order of magnitude of adoption externalities. Adoption 
externalities are related to the diffusion process of a new technology. They arise 
from the interdependence between potential users and the previous adopters of 
a new technology. The recent literature (e. g., Antonelli, 1992; Capello, 1994) 
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points at the interdependence between different generations of technology 
adopters, but does not contain a systematic presentation of the different types 
of adoption externalities and their effects on the timing of the adoption of a new 
technology. 
We refer here in particular to Choi (1994), who considers two types of net-
work externalities, viz. forward externalities and backward externalities, which are 
related to the adoption decision of a new technology characterised by network 
externalities. Forward externality means that the early adopters make their in-
vestment in a 'new technology too early from a collective economic point of view, 
since they overlook that the late adopters may take into account also the exist-
ence of network externalities in their decision making. The late adopters could 
have based their investment decision on better or more reliable information if 
the early adopters would have waited. In case of a too early adoption however, 
inferior technology may become widely adopted due to the existence of positive 
network externalities, even though the late adopters observe that the intrinsic 
value of adopted technology is lower than the one with a smaller installed base 
of users (a case of path dependency). Backward externality means that the 
late adopters do not take into account the early adopters' preferences, but may 
strand them inefficiently. Backward externality has just an adverse effect on a 
firm's technology adoption decision compared to a forward externality: back-
ward externality - the fear of being stranded - prevents the technology adop-
tion, so that its introduction will occur too late from a social point of view. Stud-
ies on forward and backward externalities can also be found in Farrell and 
Saloner (1986). 
Furthermore, Kamien et a/. (1992) use the interesting definitions of com-
petitive-advantage externality and combined-profits externality in their study on 
firms>> R&D investments. Competitive-advantage externality originated from the 
firm>>S R&D investment which both tends to reduce the firm's unit costs and 
also spills over to its rivals. The rivals' unit costs decrease then as well; the 
firm>>S R&D spending makes the rivals tougher competitors. Competitive-advan-
tage externality thus hinders the firm's investments in R&D. Competitive-advan-
tage externality may also be decisive for the firm's adoption decision of the new 
communication technology. The late adopters of technology benefit from the 
information spilled over from the early adopters. Later adoption enables a more 
proper comparison of communication technologies; the late adopter may get more 
information on the characteristics - like quality - of the different ICT systems. 
It is also possible that a firm may witness the development of different ICT net-
works (e. g., the size of installed base) or new firms adopting ICT in various 
forms. In addition, the late adopters may benefit by hiring workers who have 
already the ability to utilise the new technology. 
Uncertainty is also likely to play a prominent role in the firm's adoption 
decision of ICT. Paradoxically, the new technology which is used for the reduc-
tion of the firm's uncertainty is also contaminated with uncertain aspects itself. 
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For this reason, it makes sense to investigate more systematically such uncer-
tain aspects. Therefore, we will at the end of this section consider the types of 
uncertainty which may be related to the firm's ICT adoption decision. We will 
focus in particular on the relationship between network externalities and the 
uncertainty stemming from the new communication technology. The literature 
presents a number of potential sources of uncertainty related to a new technol-
ogy: 
Uncertain profitability of a new technology (e. g., Jensen, 1992); such 
a new ICT technology may involve: 
Market uncertainty; uncertain price of information; 
Technical uncertainty; uncertain productivity effects of a new 
technology; 
Uncertain quality of information. 
Uncertain arrival rate of future innovations or uncertain timing and sig-
nificance of future improvement I technology (Weiss, 1994); 
Strategic uncertainty; uncertainty of the rivals>> decisions (Marner an 
McCardle, 1987); 
Uncertainty on the other firm»s preferences concerning the new tech-
nology (Farrell and Saloner, 1985) or uncertain number of net-
work users (Koski, 1995). 
8- Policy conclusions (1) 
From a European perspective, appropriate ICT policies are oriented towards 
the following objectives: 
The rapid diffusion of modern infrastructures and advanced services 
over time and space; 
The minimisation of territorial (regional, national, international) 
asymmetries in the infrastructure endowment; 
The minimisation of discontinuities, in terms of «missing networks>>; 
The exploitation of new infrastructures and applications for innovative 
uses, thus trying to achieve product and process innovations, and 
enhanced competitive advantages for firms, cities and regions; 
The stimulation of competitive capacities of national suppliers. 
(1) Though the paper is the result of a common research effort of the two authors, R. Capello 
has written sections 3, 4, 6, P. Nijkamp has written sections 1, 2, 7, while the remaining sections 
have been jointly written. 
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The previous arguments suggest that «appropriate policies>> regard different 
areas of application. The first ad more general area is concerned with public 
policy, the second regards demand policy and, finally, the third one is related to 
appropriate corporate strategies of ICT suppliers. 
8.1 - Public policy 
The technological complexity and difficulty in the use of modern technolo-
gies suggest that the development of ICT technologies is a difficult process in 
which its diffusion over time and space requires «public policy>> stimuli. 
Public policy support should create a stimulus for those mechanisms that in 
diffusion processes generate accumulation rates through spin-off effects. Public 
policy should thus encourage computer networks development in areas with high 
potential demand density, i. e., central regions, where mechanisms such as net-
work externalities could generate positive cumulative effects and, thus, where a 
critical mass could be achieved in shorter time. 
Positive network externalities, in fact, arise because the total number of 
subscribers has an important effect on the user value of each additional sub-
scriber, and each additional connection has important effects on the user-value 
of the network of existing subscribers. This mechanism is more efficient when 
applied in central areas, where the user-value of the network of subscribers is 
higher. 
Related to this idea is the assumption that most economically developed 
areas are legitimated to be «networked>> first, in order to develop a cumulative 
process. A top-down public policy is thus suitable, implementing «information 
highways» between metropolitan areas. A bottom-up development policy, 
focusing on network development in local areas, runs the risk to generate a 
development model with few possible inter-linkages among islands of 
«networkers» and thus presenting a high risk of failure because of its local 
characteristic. 
A top-down approach is in this respect a more appropriate public policy 
to generate cumulative adoption processes. Nevertheless, to be efficient, these 
policies have to consider the geographical asymmetry in networks, which are 
created by following a top-down approach, only as a timing difference in in-
vestments among regions. These asymmetries must not turn into discontinuity, 
reflecting different investment intentions. In this case, in tact, discontinuity would 
become a structural difference between central and peripheral regions, the last 
ones being penalised by the lack of modern infrastructures, losing the possi-
bility of achieving advantages typical of central locations, i. e., agglomeration 
economies, and thus the possibility of overcoming limits of a peripheral 
area. 
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8.2 - Demand policy 
As already been said, the innovative use of advanced technologies pro-
vides major opportunities for users to achieve the highest economic benefits and 
advantages from these new technologies. However, the simple adoption of these 
technologies does not provide an imme~iate positive effect on corporate per-
formances. The rather complex and relatively new technological possibilities 
embodied in computer networks have drastic implications for potential users, 
imposing profound changes on the organisational structure of a firm. Because 
of their capacity to support the transactional structure of a firm, these networks 
are inevitably able to reshape inter- and intra-corporate information flows with 
profound effects on the organisation. To achieve higher economic performances 
without the use of computer networks, corporate users have to adjust their or-
ganisational structure to the new «routines>> and organisational rules (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). 
The development of modern networks is thus related to the capacity of firms 
to change their organisational routines, and to link the technological trajectories 
to organisational changes. It is very much the case that a high rigidity of atti-
tudes and behaviour exists, which hampers an adjustment to new conditions 
and the exploitation of technologies to achieve higher economic performances. 
The best way for the demand to adopt these technologies rests on the assump-
tion that technology and organisation are two intrinsically interwoven variables 
and that changes in one of the two inevitably provoke changes in the other. A 
trade-off exists between the speed of technological development, the profitability 
obtained by the exploitation of new and advanced technologies, the organisa-
tional costs required to sue them and the complexity of economic objectives 
achieved through the adoption of computer networks. 
The complexity of technological systems reflects high economic objectives 
and requires profound organisational adjustments and changes to new technolo-
gies and a long penetration speed. Consequently, we can expect a lower speed 
of diffusion for technologies implied to achieve more complex objectives, such 
as higher efficiency and effectiveness and, moreover, competitive advances. 
These last objectives imply, in fact, a relevant capacity to use these systems to 
achieve innovative products and to adapt the organisation to new ICT technology. 
The best way for users to handle the complex interrelation between tech-
nology and organisation is the development of learning processes regarding the 
following issues: 
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Possible integration of these technologies in the organisational struc-
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These learning processes are the mechanisms to develop among users 
adoption processes of these new technologies, overcoming the rigidity of atti-
tudes and behaviour associated with a transition phase, which hampers and 
adjustment to new conditions. 
8.3 -Supply policy 
Also at the supply level some policy considerations can be offered, in par-
ticular regarding two aspects: 
Policies related to corporate strategies to enter the market, i. e., mar-
keting policies; 
Policies related to best corporate strategies to face increasing compe-
tition from other manufacturing ICT firms, from e. g., strategic 
market policies. 
The need for a strong interaction between technology and organisation 
brings into focus the changing nature of computer network markets. The distinc-
tion between products and systems market is important for developing strategic 
policies by ICT suppliers. Product markets, i. e., traditional services and equip-
ment markets, are relatively homogeneous and characterised by standardised 
and mass produced outputs and the achievement of economies of scale playing 
an important role in defining competitiveness of individual firms. Technological 
knowledge required to produce such output is linked to the traditional background 
of ICT producers and suppliers. Thus, competition can be based on traditional 
mass advertising and marketing policies designed to separate an individual pro-
ducer's output from its competitors. 
Regarding computer networks and their applications, the characteristics of 
their market are different from those of traditional (tele)communications product 
markets, thus obliging suppliers to put in place different competitive strategies. 
Because the adoption of computer networks is dependent upon an interaction 
of organisation and technology, the marketing strategies need to be tailored to 
individual users, so that these technologies are essentially customised products. 
The adoption process becomes a «bricolage» process, where new techno-
logical possibilities meet the needs of users, generating larger markets for com-
puter networks and their applications. This «bricolage>> process can also be 
developed by manufacturing ICT suppliers without strategies of cooperation 
agreements with: 
Some large organisational experts; 
Some large firms users, strong in their learning processes; 
Some experts in the field of software and integrated systems; 
Some value-added resellers, or experts in telematics applications. 
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In this way, complementary technological, organisational and strategic know-
how can be exploited and most appropriate marketing policies developed. 
Finally, the interest in understanding and promoting the ICT sector and its 
diffusion over time and space stems from the important role this sector is in-
creasingly playing in generating competitiveness of firms and comparative ad-
vantages tor regions. In the so-called «information economy», new ICT strate-
gies are the strategic means to achieve better economic performances tor 
economic agents and all regions. 
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